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ABSTRACT
With the recent surge of social networks like Facebook, new
forms of recommendations have become possible – personal-
ized recommendations of ads, content, and even new social
and product connections based on one’s social interactions.
In this paper, we study whether “social recommendations”,
or recommendations that utilize a user’s social network, can
be made without disclosing sensitive links between users.
More precisely, we quantify the loss in utility when existing
recommendation algorithms are modified to satisfy a strong
notion of privacy called differential privacy. We propose
lower bounds on the minimum loss in utility for any recom-
mendation algorithm that is differentially private. We also
propose two recommendation algorithms that satisfy differ-
ential privacy, analyze their performance in comparison to
the lower bound, both analytically and experimentally, and
show that good private social recommendations are feasible
only for a few users in the social network or for a lenient
setting of privacy parameters.
1. INTRODUCTION
Making recommendations or suggestions to users to in-
crease their degree of engagement is a common practice for
websites. For instance, Facebook recommends friends to
existing users, Amazon suggests products, and Netflix rec-
ommends movies, in each case with the goal of making as
relevant a recommendation to the user as possible. Recom-
mending the right content, product, or ad to an individual is
one of the most important tasks in today’s web companies.
With the boom in social networking many companies are
striving to incorporate the likes and dislikes of an individ-
ual’s social neighborhood. There has been much research
and industrial activity to solve two problems: (a) recom-
mending content, products, ads not only based on the indi-
vidual’s prior history but also based on the history of those
the individual trusts [12, 2], and (b) recommending others
whom the individual might trust. Recommendations based
on social connections are especially effective for users who
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have seen very few movies, bought only a couple of products,
or never clicked on ads; while traditional recommender sys-
tems default to generic recommendations, a social-network
aware system can provide useful recommendations based on
active friends. Companies like TrustedOpinion1 and SoMR2
generate content and ad recommendations by leveraging so-
cial networks. In fact, Facebook3, Yahoo!4 and Google5 are
opening their social networks to third party developers to
encourage social network-aware recommender systems.
In addition, a social network might want to use a different
underlying social network, such as one derived from e-mail
records or Instant Messenger connections, to suggest friends
(e.g. Facebook already uses contacts imported from an ad-
dress book as suggestions). Social connections could also be
used to recommend products or advertisements to users—
Netflix (or Opentable or Yelp) could recommend movies (or
restaurants) to a subscriber based on her friends’ activities
and ratings. In fact, rather than using the entire social
graph, the system could use only a subset of trusted edges
for that application (for instance, a user might only trust
the movie recommendations of a subset of her friends).
However, these improved recommendations based on so-
cial connections come at a cost – a recommendation can
potentially lead to a privacy breach by revealing sensitive
information. For instance, while the social network links
might be public, both the user-product links and the user-
user-trust links must be kept secret. (Knowing that your
friend doesn’t trust your judgement about books might be
a breach of privacy). Similarly, revealing an edge in an e-
mail graph, or revealing that a particular user purchased
a sensitive product, constitutes a potentially serious breach
of user privacy. Recommendations can indeed lead to such
privacy breaches even without the use of social connections
in the recommendation algorithm [5]. The privacy concerns
posed by recommender systems and use of the social network
graph have been at the forefront of industry discussion on
the topic. In 2007, Facebook attempted to incorporate the
product purchases made by one’s friends into the stream of
news one receives while visiting the site through a product
called Beacon. Their launch showed that people interact
with many websites and products in a way that they would
not want their friends to know about, leading to several
privacy lawsuits, and an eventual complete removal of the
1http://www.trustedopinion.com/
2http://www.somrnetworks.com/
3http://developers.facebook.com/connect.php
4http://developer.yahoo.com/yos/intro/
5http://www.google.com/friendconnect/
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feature by Facebook.
In this paper, we present the first theoretical study of
the privacy-utility trade-offs in social recommender systems.
While there are many different settings where social recom-
mendations are used (friend/product recommendations, or
trust propagation), and each leads to a slightly different for-
mulation of the privacy problem (the sensitive information
is different in each case), all these problems have the fol-
lowing common structure – recommendations are made on
a graph where some subset of edges are sensitive. For clar-
ity of exposition, we ignore (by and large) scenario specific
constraints, and focus on the following general model. We
consider a graph where all the edges are sensitive, and an
algorithm that recommends a single node v in the graph
to some target node u. We assume that the algorithm is
based on a utility function that encodes the “goodness” of
recommending each node in the graph to this target node.
Suggestions for utility functions include number of common
neighbors, weighted paths and PageRank distributions [21].
We consider an attacker who wishes to deduce the existence
of a single edge (x, y) in the graph by passively observing the
recommendation (v, u). We measure the privacy of the algo-
rithm using differential privacy – the ratio of the likelihoods
of the algorithm recommending (v, u) on the graphs with
the edge (x, y) and without the edge (x, y), respectively. In
this setting, we ask the question: to what extent can edge
recommendations be accurate while preserving differential
privacy?
Our Contributions and Overview. In this paper we
present the following results on the accuracy of differentially
private social recommendations.
• We present a trade-off between the accuracy and pri-
vacy of any social recommendation algorithm that is
based on any general utility function. This trade-off
shows an inevitable lower bound on the privacy pa-
rameter  that must be incurred by an algorithm that
wishes to guarantee any constant-factor approximation
of the maximum utility. (Section 4)
• We present lower bounds on accuracy and privacy for
algorithms based on specific utility functions previ-
ously suggested for recommending edges in a social
network – number of common neighbors and weighted
paths [21]. Our trade-offs for these specific utility func-
tions present stronger lower bounds than the general
one that is applicable for all utility functions. (Section
5)
• We adapt two well known privacy preserving algo-
rithms from the differential privacy literature for the
problem of social recommendations. The first (which
we call Laplace), is based on adding random noise
drawn from a Laplace distribution to the utility vector
[8] and then recommending the highest utility node.
The second (Exponential), is based on exponential smooth-
ing [15]. We analyze and compare the accuracy of the
two algorithms and comment on their relative merits.
(Section 6)
• We perform experiments on a real graph using the
number of common neighbors utility function. The
experiments compare the algorithms Laplace, Expo-
nential, and our lower bound. Our experiments sug-
gest three takeaways: (i) For most nodes, the lower
bounds suggest that there is a huge inevitable trade-
off between privacy and accuracy when making social
recommendations; (ii) The more natural Laplace algo-
rithm performs as well as Exponential; and (iii) For a
large fraction of nodes, both Laplace and Exponential
almost achieve the maximum accuracy level suggested
by our theoretical lower bound. (Section 7)
• We briefly consider the setting when an algorithm may
not know (or be able to compute efficiently) the entire
utility vector. We recognize that both Laplace and Ex-
ponential algorithms assume the knowledge of all the
utilities (for every node) when recommending to a tar-
get node. We propose and analyze a sampling based
linear smoothing algorithm that does not require all
utilities to be pre-computed. We conclude by men-
tioning several directions for future work. (Section 8)
We now discuss related work and then formalize the mod-
els and definitions in Section 3.
2. RELATEDWORK
Several papers propose that the social connections avail-
able can be effectively utilized for enhancing online appli-
cations [12, 2]. Golbeck [10] uses the trust relationships
expressed through social connections for personalized movie
recommendations and shows that the accuracy of the ratings
outperform those produced by a collaborative filtering algo-
rithm not utilizing the social graph. Mislove et al. [16] at-
tempt an integration of web search with social networks and
explore the use of trust relationships, such as social links, to
thwart unwanted communication [17]. Approaches incorpo-
rating trust models into recommender systems are gaining
momentum both in academic research [25], [18], [23], and in
real products. Examples include, Chorus6, which provides
social app recommendations for the iPhone; Fruggo.com7,
a social e-commerce site; and WellNet’s8 online social net-
working program for health care coordination9.
Calandrino et al. [5] demonstrate that algorithms that
recommend products based on a friends’ purchases have very
practical privacy concerns: “passive observations of Ama-
zon.com’s recommendations are sufficient to make valid in-
ferences about individuals’ purchase histories”. McSherry et
al. [14] show how to adapt the leading algorithms used in the
Netflix prize for movie recommendations to make privacy-
preserving recommendations. Their work does not apply
to algorithms that rely on the underlying social graph be-
tween users, as the user-user connections have not been re-
leased as part of the Netflix competition. Aı¨meur et al. [1]
study the problem of personalized recommendations in gen-
eral. Dwork et al. [9] pose the problem of constructing
differentially private analysis of social networks. Toubiana
et al. [24] propose a framework for privacy preserving tar-
geted advertising – while targeting based on user history
is considered, targeting based on social interactions is not
considered.
A related and independent work [4] considers the problem
of mining top-k frequent item-set. Although they consider
mechanisms analogous to the ones we propose, since we solve
6http://www.envionetworks.com/
7http://fruugo.com/
8http://www.wellnet.com/
9www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/118628.php
two different problems, the focus of their analysis, notion of
utility, and conclusions substantially differ from ours.
3. MODEL
In this section, we describe the model for privacy-preserving
social recommendations. We first define a social recommen-
dation algorithm and then mention notions of monotonicity
and accuracy of an algorithm. We then define axioms fol-
lowed by typical utility functions that such algorithms are
based on. Finally, we define differential privacy.
3.1 Social Recommendation Algorithm
Let G = (V,E) be the graph that describes the social net-
work. Each recommendation is an edge (i, r), where node i
is recommended to the target node r. Given a graph G, and
a target node r, we denote the utility of recommending node
i to node r by uG,ri . Further, we assume that a recommen-
dation algorithm R is a probability vector on all nodes. Let
pG,ri denote the probability of recommending node i to node
r in graph G by a specified algorithm. When the graph G
and the source node r are clear from context, we drop G and
r from the notation – ui denotes the utility of recommend-
ing i, and pi denotes the probability that R recommends i.
We further define umax = maxi ui.
We consider algorithms that attempt to maximize the ex-
pected utility (
∑
i ui · pi) of each recommendation. If we
assume (without loss of generality) that the utility of the
least useful recommendation is 0, the accuracy of such an
algorithm can be defined as:
Definition 1 (Accuracy). An algorithm A is said to
be (1− δ)-accurate if given any set of utilities ui (for all i)
denoted by ~u, A recommends node i with probability pi such
that (1− δ) = min~u
∑
uipi
umax
.
Therefore, an algorithm is said to be (1− δ)-accurate if for
any utility vector, the algorithm’s expected utility is at least
(1−δ) times the utility of the highest utility node in the given
utility vector. It is easy to check that for the case when the
utility of the least useful recommendation is umin, in all of
our subsequent discussions, the definition of accuracy we
use is equivalent to accuracy defined as the fraction of the
difference between umax and umin.
Scale Invariance of Sensitivity and Utility Func-
tions. We initiate a small discussion on what happens
when the utility values for all potential recommendable nodes
are scaled by a multiplicative factor, or changed by an addi-
tive constant. Intuitively, since the scale of utilities is chosen
arbitrarily, one would expect the algorithms and the anal-
ysis to be invariant to such numeric changes. However, be-
cause of the constraints imposed by the desire to be privacy-
preserving, where the privacy-preservation is with respect to
a presence or absence of a particular edge, the scale invari-
ance assumptions require a more careful articulation. In
particular, the crucial point of interaction between the pri-
vacy requirement and the utility function is the concept of
sensitivity, denoted by ∆f , which is the maximum change
in a utility vector ~u that can occur due to an addition or
removal of one edge in the graph. Observe that if we scale a
utility function by a multiplicative constant, the sensitivity
of the utility function is scaled as well by the same constant.
Without loss of generality, and for ease of subsequent expo-
sition, we assume that ∆f = 1, an assumption that implies
that the magnitudes of the utilities are now meaningful, as
the higher utility magnitude corresponds to more edges that
need to be added or removed in the graph in order to achieve
it. Equivalently, we could have chosen to let the utilities be
scale invariant, but would then need to compute and reason
in terms of the sensitivity of the utility function.
Another property that is natural of a recommendation
algorithm is monotonicity:
Definition 2 (Monotonicity). An algorithm is said
to be monotonic if ∀i, j, ui ≥ uj implies that pi ≥ pj.
3.2 Axioms on Utility Functions
We now define two axioms that we believe should be sat-
isfied by any meaningful utility function in the context of
recommendations on a social network. These axioms are
later used in proving our theoretical results. Our axioms are
inspired by the work of [21] and the specific utility functions
they consider, which include: number of common neighbors,
sum of weighted paths, and PageRank based utility mea-
sures.
Axiom 1 (Exchangeability). Let G be a graph and
let h be an isomorphism on the nodes giving graph Gh, s.t.
for target node r, h(r) = r. Then ∀i : uG,ri = uGh,rh(i) .
This axiom captures the intuition that the utility of a
node i should not depend on the node’s name. Rather, its
utility with respect to target node r only depends on the
structural properties of the graph, and so, nodes that are
isomorphic from the perspective of the target node r should
have the same utility.
Axiom 2 (Concentration Axiom). There exists S ⊂
V (G), such that |S| = β, and ∑i∈S ui ≥ Ω(1)∑i∈V (G) ui.
This says that there are some β nodes that together have
at least a constant fraction of the total utility mass. This ax-
iom is likely to be satisfied for small enough β, since usually
there are some nodes that are very good for recommendation
and many that are not so good.
In the subsequent lower bound sections, we only consider
monotonic algorithms for utility functions that satisfy the
exchangeability axiom as well as the concentration axiom
for a reasonable choice of β.
A running example throughout the paper of a utility func-
tion that satisfies these axioms in practical settings and is
often deployed [21] is that of the number of common neigh-
bors utility function: given a target node r and a graph
G, the common neighbors utility metric assigns a utility
uG,ri = c(i, r), where c(i, r) is the number of common neigh-
bors between i and r.
3.3 Differential privacy
Differential privacy [6] is a strong definition of privacy
that is based on the following principle: an algorithm pre-
serves the privacy of an entity if the algorithm’s output is
not sensitive to the presence or absence of the entity’s infor-
mation in the input data set. In our setting of graph-based
social recommendations, we wish to maintain the presence
(or absence) of an edge in the graph private. Hence, the
privacy definition can be formally stated as follows.
Definition 3. A recommendation algorithm R satisfies
-differential privacy if for any pair of graphs G and G′ that
differ in one edge (i.e., G = G′ + {e} or vice versa) and
every set of possible recommendations S,
Pr[R(G) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[R(G′) ∈ S] (1)
where the probabilities are over the random coins of R.
Differential privacy has been widely used in the privacy liter-
ature [3, 8, 13, 15, 7], since it is even resilient to adversaries
who know all but one edges in the graph, and guarantees
privacy for multiple runs of the algorithm. While weaker
notions of privacy have also been considered in the litera-
ture, in this paper we focus on the strong differential privacy
definition only. Since in social recommendations protecting
privacy is extremely important, it seems reasonable to first
explore and understand the strongest notions of privacy.
In this paper, we only consider the utility of a single social
recommendation. We note that in this setting, we can relax
the differential privacy definition such that Equation 1 only
holds for graphs G and G′ that differ in an edge e that is
not incident on r, the target of the recommendation. This
mirrors the natural setting where (a) one recommendation
is made to the attacker (r), (b) only the target node (the
attacker) sees the recommendation. By considering G and
G′ that differ in e = (i, r), the adversary can only learn
about his neighborhood (which he is aware of to start with)
and not learn whether two legitimate nodes in the graph
are connected. While we consider a single recommendation
throughout the paper, we use the relaxed variant of differ-
ential privacy only in Sections 5 and 7.
4. GENERAL LOWER BOUND
In this section we prove a lower bound on the privacy
parameter  on any differentially private recommendation
algorithm that (a) achieves a constant accuracy and (b) is
based on any utility function that satisfies the exchangeabil-
ity and concentration.
Let us first sketch the proof technique for the lower bound
using the number of common neighbors utility metric, and
then state the lower bound for a general utility metric. An
interested reader can find the full proofs in the Appendix.
Recall that given a target node r and a graphG, the common
neighbors utility metric assigns a utility uG,ri = c(i, r), where
c(i, r) is the number of common neighbors between i and r.
The nodes in any graph can be split into two groups – V rhi,
nodes which have a high utility for the target node r and
V rlo, nodes that have a low utility. In the case of common
neighbors, all nodes i in the 2-hop neighborhood of r (who
have at least one common neighbor with r) can be part of
V rhi and the rest in V
r
lo. Since the recommendation algorithm
has to achieve a constant accuracy, it has to recommend one
of the high utility nodes with constant probability.
By the concentration axiom, there are only a few nodes
in V rhi, but there are many nodes in V
r
lo; in the case of com-
mon neighbors, node r may only have 10s or 100s of 2-hop
neighbors in a graph of millions of users. Hence, there exists
a node i in the high utility group and a node ` in the low
utility group such that Γ = pi/p` is very large (Ω(n)). At
this point, we show that we can carefully modify the graph
G by adding and/or deleting a small number (t) of edges in
such a way that the node ` with the smallest probability of
being recommended in G becomes the node with the highest
utility in G′. By the exchangeability axiom, we can show
that there always exist some t edges that make this possi-
ble. For instance in the common neighbors case, we can do
this by adding edges between a node i and t of r’s neigh-
bors, where t > maxi c(i, r). It now follows from differential
privacy that
 ≥ 1
t
log Γ
More generally, let V rhi be the set of nodes 1, . . . , k each of
which have utility ui > (1−c)umax, and let V rlo be the nodes
k + 1, . . . , n each of which have ui ≤ (1 − c)umax utility of
being recommended to target node r. Recall that umax is
the utility of the highest utility node. Let t be the number
of edge alterations required to turn a node with the smallest
probability of being recommended from the low utility group
into a node of maximum utility in the modified graph. The
following lemma states the main trade-off relationship be-
tween the accuracy parameter δ and the privacy parameter
 of a recommendation algorithm.
Lemma 1.  ≥ 1
t
(
ln( c−δ
δ
) + ln(n−k
k+1
)
)
This lemma gives us a lower bound on the privacy guar-
antee  in terms of the utility parameter δ. Equivalently,
Corollary 1. 1− δ ≤ 1− c(n−k)
n−k+(k+1)et
By using the concentration axiom with parameter β we
can prove the following.
Lemma 2. For (1− δ) = Ω(1) and β = o(n/ logn),
 ≥ logn− o(logn)
t
(2)
This expression can be intuitively interpreted as follows:
in order to achieve good accuracy with a reasonable amount
of privacy (where  is independent of n), either the number
of nodes with high utility needs to be very large (i.e. β needs
to be very large, Ω(n/ logn)), or the number of steps needed
to bring up any node’s utility to the highest utility needs to
be large (i.e. t needs to be large, Ω(logn)).
We shall use this relationship from Lemma 2 in the sub-
sequent section to prove stronger lower bounds for specific
utility functions. Below we mention a generic lower bound
that applies to any utility function. Note that we only need
an upper bound on t. The tighter upper bound we are able
to prove on t, the better lower bound we get for .
Using the exchangeability axiom, we can show that t ≤
4∗dmax in any graph. Consider the highest utility node and
the lowest utility node, say x and y respectively. These
nodes can be interchanged by deleting all of x’s current
edges, adding edges from x to y’s neighbors, and doing the
same for y. This requires at most 4 ∗ dmax changes. Hence,
Theorem 1. For a graph with maximum degree dmax =
α logn, a differentially private algorithm can guarantee con-
stant accuracy only if
 ≥ 1
α
(
1
4
− o(1)
)
(3)
In the next section, we present stronger lower bounds for
two well studied utility functions – common neighbors and
weighted paths.
5. LOWERBOUNDSFORSPECIFICUTIL-
ITY FUNCTIONS
In this section, we start from Lemma 2 and prove stronger
lower bounds for specific utility functions by proving stronger
upper bounds on t. Proofs and more details can be found
in the Appendix.
5.1 Common neighbors lower bound
Consider a graph and a target node r. As we saw in the
previous section, we can make any node x have the highest
utility by adding edges to all of r’s neighbors. If dr is r’s
degree, it suffices to add t = dr+O(1) edges to make a node
the highest utility node. We state the following theorem for
a more general version of common neighbors utility function
below.
Theorem 2. Let U be a utility function that depends only
on and is monotonically increasing with c(x, y), the number
of common neighbors between x and y. A recommendation
algorithm based on U that guarantees any constant approx-
imation to utility for target node r has a lower bound on
privacy given by  ≥ 1−o(1)
α
where dr = α logn.
As we will show in Section 7, this is a very strong lower
bound. Since a significant fraction of nodes in real-world
graphs have small dr (due to a power law degree distribu-
tion), we can expect no algorithm based on common neigh-
bors utility to be both accurate on most nodes and satisfy
differential with a reasonable .
5.2 Weighted Paths
A natural extension of the common neighbors utility func-
tion and one whose usefulness is supported by the literature
[21], is the weighted path utility function, defined as
score(s, y) =
∑inf
l=2 γ
l−1|paths(l)(s,y)|,
where |paths(l)(s,y)| denotes the number of length l paths from
s to y. Typically, one would consider using small values of
γ, such as γ = 0.005, so that the weighted paths score is a
“smoothed version” of the common neighbors score.
Again let r be the target node. To make node y the highest
utility node, we add edges such that y has cdr common
neighbors with r. Now, the goal is to choose c > 1 such
that this alone is sufficient to ensure that y has the highest
utility. This is done by showing that (a) no other node
has more than dr common neighbors with r, and (b) the
utility derived from paths of length ≥ 3 cannot offset the
additional common neighbors between y and r (for suitably
small γ). Finally, we show that this requires adding only
t < dr + 2 ∗ (c− 1) +O(1).
Theorem 3. For weighted paths based utility functions
with parameter γ, we have t ≤ (1 + o(1))dr when making
recommendations for node r, if γ = o( 1
dmax
). Therefore, for
an algorithm to guarantee constant approximation to utility,
the privacy must be  ≥ 1
α
(1− o(1)) where dr = α logn.
6. PRIVACY-PRESERVINGRECOMMENDA-
TION ALGORITHMS
There has been a wealth of literature on developing differ-
entially private algorithms [3, 8, 15]. In this section we will
adapt two well known tools, Laplace noise addition [8] and
exponential smoothing [15], to our problem. For the pur-
pose of this section, we will assume that given a graph and
a target node, our algorithm has access to (or can efficiently
compute) the utilities ui for all other nodes in the graph.
Given this vector of utilities, our goal is to compute a vec-
tor of probabilities pi such that (a)
∑
i ui · pi is maximized,
and (b) differential privacy is satisfied.
Clearly, maximum accuracy is achieved by recommending
the node with utility umax. However, it is well known that
any algorithm that satisfies differential privacy must recom-
mend every node, even the ones that have zero utility, with a
non-zero probability [20]. Indeed, suppose for graph G and
target node r, an algorithm assigns 0 probability to some
node x with utility uG,rx and a positive probability to some
node y, with utility uG,ry . Transform G into G
′ as follows:
connect x to all of y’s neighbors in G and disconnect x from
all its neighbors in G. Do the same for y. This in turns cre-
ates an isomorphism h between G and G′, where h(r) = r.
Hence, by the exchangeability axiom, the algorithm will rec-
ommend y with 0 probability. Thus, there is a path from G
to G′ of length t such that py goes from a positive number
to 0. This leads to a breach of differential privacy.
The following two algorithms ensure differential privacy:
6.1 Exponential mechanism
The exponential mechanism creates a smooth probability
distribution from the utility vector and then samples from
that.
Definition 4. Exponential mechanism: Given nodes
with utilities (u1, . . . , ui, . . . , un), algorithm AE() recom-
mends node i with probability
e

∆f
ui/
∑n
k=1 e

∆f
uk , where  ≥ 0 is the privacy parameter,
and ∆f is the sensitivity of the utility function10.
Theorem 4. [15] AE() guarantees  differential privacy.
6.2 Laplace mechanism
Unlike the exponential mechanism, the Laplace mecha-
nism mimics the optimal mechanism. It first adds random
noise drawn from a Laplace distribution, and like the opti-
mal mechanism, picks the node with the maximum noise-
infused utility.
Definition 5. Laplace mechanism: Given nodes with
utilities (u1, . . . , ui, . . . , un), algorithm AL() first computes
a modified utility vector (u′1, . . . , u
′
n) as follows: u
′
i = ui + r
where r is a random variable chosen from the Laplace distri-
bution with scale ( ∆f

)11 independently at random for each
i. Then, AL() recommends node z whose noisy utility is
maximal among all nodes, i.e. z = arg maxi u
′
i.
Theorem 5. AL() guarantees  differential privacy.
Proof. The proof follows from the privacy proof of the
Laplace mechanism in the context of publishing privacy-
preserving histograms [8] by observing that one could treat
each node as a histogram bin and release the noisy count
for the value in that bin, u′i. Since AL() is effectively doing
post-processing by releasing only the name of the bin with
the highest noisy count, the algorithm remains private.
10∆f = maxr maxG,G′:G=G′+e || ~uG,r − ~uG′,r||
11In this distribution, the pdf at y is 
2∆f
exp(−|y|/∆f)
An astute reader might remark at this point that the
Laplace mechanism as stated does not satisfy the mono-
tonicity property that we relied upon in our lower bound
proofs. Indeed, the Laplace mechanism satisfies the prop-
erty only in expectation; however, that is not an obstacle to
our analysis since in order to meaningfully compare the per-
formance of Laplace mechanism with other mechanisms and
with the theoretical bound on performance, we would need
to evaluate its expected, rather than one-time, performance.
6.3 Exponential vs Laplace Mechanisms
It is natural to ask whether there is an equivalence be-
tween the two approaches of transforming a non-private al-
gorithm to a privacy-preserving algorithm or how they would
compare, perhaps depending on the setting. We present pre-
liminary results on comparing the utilities when there are
only two possible recommendations (n = 2). The theorem
is stated below and the proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 6. Let UE and UL denote the utilities achieved
by AE() and AL() on input vector (u1, u2), respectively.
Wlog, assume u1 ≥ u2. Then UE = u1 eu1eu1+eu2 +u2 e
u2
eu1+eu2
and
UL = u1(1 − 12e−(u1−u2) − (u1−u2)4e(u1−u2) ) + u2(
1
2
e−(u1−u2) +
(u1−u2)
4e(u1−u2) )
To our knowledge, in the course of the proof we give the
first explicit closed form expression for the probabilities of
each of the two nodes being recommended by Laplace mech-
anism (the work of [19] gives a formula that does not apply
to our setting).
Although the expressions for UE and UL are difficult to
compare by eye-balling, by plugging in various values of
u1 and u2 into the formulas, one infers that the Exponen-
tial mechanism slightly outperforms the Laplace mechanism,
when  is very small and the difference between u1 and u2 is
large. We leave it for future work to simplify these as well
as extend the analysis to the n > 2 case.
Implementation efficiency. The Laplace mechanism is
more intuitive than the Exponential mechanism, and more
likely to receive executive buy-in in a real-world environ-
ment. Furthermore, it has the advantage that it can be
implemented more easily than the Exponential mechanism.
AL requires computing the noisy utilities and then selecting
the node with the highest noisy utility, which takes linear
time. AE requires first computing a set of smoothed utilities
and then sampling from the probability distribution induced
by them, which can be accomplished in linear time using the
alias-urn method suggested by [22], but likely slightly less
practically efficiently than AL.
7. UTILITY ACHIEVABLE IN PRACTICE
ON A REAL GRAPH
In this section we present experimental results on a real
graph and for the # of common neighbors utility function.
The experiments compare the algorithms Laplace, Exponen-
tial, and our lower bound. Our experiments suggest three
takeaways: (i) For most nodes, the lower bounds suggest
that there is a huge inevitable trade-off between privacy
and accuracy when making social recommendations; (ii) The
more natural Laplace mechanism performs as well as the Ex-
ponential mechanism; and (iii) For a large fraction of nodes,
the accuracy achieved by Laplace and Exponential mecha-
nisms does not substantially differ from the best possible
accuracy suggested by our theoretical lower bound.
7.1 Experimental Setup
For our experiments we use the Wikipedia vote network
[11] available from Stanford Network Analysis Package12.
Some users in Wikipedia are administrators, who have ac-
cess to additional technical features. Users are elected to
be administrators via a public vote of other users and ad-
ministrators. The Wikipedia vote network consists of all
users participating in the elections (either casting a vote or
being vote on), since inception of Wikipedia until January
2008. We turn the network of [11] into an undirected net-
work, where each node represents a user and an edge from
node i to node j represents that user i voted on user j or
user j voted on user i. This obtained network consists of
7,115 nodes and 100,762 edges. Although the Wikipedia
vote network is publicly available, and hence the edges in it
are not private, we believe that the graph itself exhibits the
structure and properties of some of the graphs in which one
would want to preserve privacy, such as the graph of social
connections and people’s product purchases.
For each pair of nodes in the social network, except nodes
that share an edge, we compute the number of common
neighbors they have in the Wikipedia vote network. Then,
assuming we will make one recommendation for each node in
the graph, we compute the expected accuracy of recommen-
dation for that node. For the Exponential mechanism and
the theoretical bound, given the utilities of recommending
each node to a given node v, we can compute the expected
accuracy and the theoretical bound on accuracy exactly. For
the Laplace mechanism, we compute its expected accuracy
by running 1, 000 independent trials of the Laplace mecha-
nism, and averaging the utilities obtained in those trials, for
each node in the graph.13
7.2 Exponential vs Laplace in practice
We first observe in Figure 1 that for all nodes in the
Wikipedia vote network, the Laplace mechanism achieves
nearly identical accuracy as the Exponential mechanism.
This confirms our hypothesis of Section 6 that Exponential
and Laplace mechanisms are nearly equivalent in practical
settings, and implies that one can use the more intuitive and
easily implementable Laplace mechanism in practice.
7.3 Social Recommendations: Good or Pri-
vate?
We now proceed to evaluate the accuracy of the Exponen-
tial mechanism and compare it with the best accuracy one
can hope to achieve using a privacy-preserving recommen-
dation algorithm, as computed according to our theoretical
bound of Corollary 1.
For ease of visual presentation, we assume that we do not
care about node identities; we number the nodes in decreas-
ing order of the accuracy one can hope for when making
the recommendation for that node, as predicted by the the-
oretical bound. For each node, the graph in Figure 2 shows
the theoretical bound and the accuracy achieved by the Ex-
12http://snap.stanford.edu/data/wiki-Vote.html
13Out of the 7,115 nodes, there are 60 nodes that have no
common neighbors with anyone except nodes they are al-
ready connected to. We omit those nodes from our analysis.
Figure 1: Accuracy achieved by Exponential and
Laplace mechanisms on Wikipedia vote network using
# of common neighbors as a measure of utility. The
x-axis represents the node number, the y-axis - the ac-
curacy of recommendation for that node. The top graph
is for desired privacy guarantee of  = 0.1, the bottom -
for  = 0.5.
ponential mechanism. Due to our chosen numbering of the
nodes, the theoretical bound is a smooth monotonically de-
creasing function of the node number, whereas the achieved
accuracy is not necessarily monotonically decreasing (and
thus, in places, does not appear as a line).
As can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, for some nodes,
the Exponential mechanism performs quite well, achieving
nearly perfect accuracy. However, the number of such nodes
is fairly small - the Exponential mechanism achieves better
than 0.9 approximation for less than 1.5% of the nodes when
 = 0.1 and less than 21% of the nodes when  = 0.5, it
achieves better than 0.8 approximation for less than 2% of
the nodes when  = 0.1 and less than 25.5% of the nodes
when  = 0.5. This matches the intuition that by making
the privacy requirement more lenient, one can hope to make
better quality recommendations for more nodes; however,
this also pinpoints the fact that for most nodes, the Expo-
nential mechanism does not achieve good accuracy.
Although there is a possibility that one could develop bet-
ter privacy-preserving recommendation mechanisms than Ex-
ponential or Laplace, this experiment shows that for a large
number of target nodes, our theoretical bound limits the
best accuracy one can hope to achieve privately quite severely.
For example, for  = 0.1, no privacy-preserving algorithm
can hope to achieve a better than 70% accuracy for more
than 9% of the nodes. This finding throws into serious ques-
tion the feasibility of developing social recommendation al-
gorithms that are both accurate and privacy-preserving for
many real-world settings.
Finally, in practice, it is the least connected nodes that
Figure 2: Accuracy achieved by Exponential mecha-
nisms and predicted by theoretical bound on Wikipedia
vote network using # of common neighbors as a measure
of utility. The x-axis represents the node number, the y-
axis - the expected accuracy of recommendation for that
node. The top graph is for desired privacy guarantee of
 = 0.1, the bottom - for  = 0.5.
are likely to benefit most from receiving high quality rec-
ommendations. However, our experiments suggest that the
low degree nodes are also the most vulnerable to receiv-
ing low accuracy recommendations due to needs of privacy-
preservation: see Figure 4 for an illustration of how accuracy
depends on the degree of the node. This further suggests
that, in practice, one has to make a choice between preserv-
ing accuracy vs preserving privacy.
7.4 AreAE andAL good enough forutility func-
tion based on common neighbors?
As we have experimentally observed in Figure 2, the Ex-
ponential mechanism achieves good accuracy compared to
the best achievable accuracy predicted by our theoretical
bound. We can formalize this statement rigorously as fol-
lows (proved in the Appendix):
Lemma 3. Let AE denote the accuracy of the Exponential
mechanism, and AO denote the upper bound on the accuracy
that can be achieved by any privacy-preserving algorithm.
Then, for utility functions based on the number of common
neighbors between two nodes, AE
AO
≥ 1
k+1
, where k is the
number of nodes with non-zero utility.
Furthermore,
Lemma 4. For utility vector of the form
u = (umax, . . . , umax, 0, . . . , 0),
AE
AO
≥ k
k+1
, where k is the
number of nodes with non-zero utility,
For real-world graphs, we expect the number of nodes with
non-zero utility k to be fairly small, and thus, the Expo-
Figure 3: Performance of the Exponential mechanisms
and predicted by theoretical bound on Wikipedia vote
network using # of common neighbors as a measure of
utility. The x-axis represents the accuracy, the y-axis -
the expected percentage of nodes for whom that accu-
racy of recommendation is achieved (or predicted by the
theoretical bound). The top graph is for desired privacy
guarantee of  = 0.1, the bottom - for  = 0.5.
nential mechanism to achieve a good approximation to the
best possible accuracy achievable by a privacy-preserving so-
cial recommendation algorithm. Furthermore, observe that
Corollary 1 merely gives an upper bound on accuracy achiev-
able in a privacy-preserving manner, but it might be the case
that tighter lower bounds can be obtained. Hence, in many
ways, the Exponential and Laplace mechanisms are repre-
sentative of the class of good privacy-preserving mechanisms
one can hope for.
8. EXTENSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
8.1 Vertex privacy and non-monotone algo-
rithms
We considered the setting of graph based social recom-
mendations where we wished to maintain private the infor-
mation about the presence or absence of an edge in the graph
but our reasoning and results can easily be generalized to a
setting where we would like to protect the entire identity of
a node. To achieve that, one would need to strengthen the
definition of the recommendation algorithm satisfying dif-
ferential privacy to consider graphs that differ in one node,
rather than one edge, and adjust the value of t, the number
of edge alterations to turn a node from the low utility group
into a node of maximum utility, respectively.
Furthermore, our results can be generalized to social rec-
ommendation algorithms that do not satisfy the monotonic-
ity property. For clarity of exposition, we omit the exact
statements and proofs of lemmas analogous to Lemmas 1
Figure 4: Accuracy achieved by Exponential mechanism
and predicted by Theoretical Bound as a function of node
degree,  = 0.5
and 2 but remark that the statement formulations and our
qualitative conclusions will remain essentially unchanged,
with the exception of the meaning of variable t. Without
the monotonicity property, t would correspond to the num-
ber of edge alterations necessary to exchange the node with
the smallest probability of being recommended and the node
with the highest utility, rather than to the number of edge
alterations necessary to make the node with the smallest
probability of being recommended into the node with the
highest utility, leading to a higher value for t.
8.2 What if utility vectors are unknown?
Both the differentially private algorithms we considered
in Section 6 assume the knowledge of the entire utility vec-
tor. This assumption cannot be made in social networks for
various reasons. Firstly, computing as well as storing the
utility of n2 pairs is prohibitively expensive, when dealing
with graphs of several hundred million nodes. Secondly, even
if one could compute and store them, these graphs change
at staggering rates, therefore, utility vectors are also con-
stantly changing. We believe that this is a very important
and interesting problem. In this section, we explore a simple
algorithm that assumes no knowledge of the utility vector;
it only assumes that sampling from the utility vector can be
done efficiently.
8.2.1 Sampling and Linear Smoothing
Suppose we are given an algorithm A which is a γ ap-
proximation in terms of utility, and not provably private.
We show how to modify the algorithm A to guarantee dif-
ferential privacy, while still preserving, to some extent, the
utility approximation of A. The proof of the following the-
orem, and a note, are placed in the appendix.
Definition 6. Given algorithm A = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn),
algorithm AS(x) recommends node i with probability
1−x
n
+
xpi, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is a parameter.
Theorem 7. AS(x) guarantees ln(1 +
nx
1−x )-differential
privacy and a xγ approximation of utility.
Another idea worth exploring is perturbing the input graph
(by adding/deleting a fraction of possible edges) and then
sampling and recommending from it. What is the rela-
tionship between the extent of perturbation and the util-
ity/privacy guarantees?
8.3 Future Work
Several interesting questions remain unexplored in this
work. While we have considered some specific utility func-
tions in this paper, it would be nice to look more. Further,
our motivation was to look at the most stringent require-
ment in terms of privacy; however, a natural question is
to understand utility-privacy trade-offs for certain typical
graphs that arise in social networks.
This paper only considers lower bounds and algorithms
for making one single recommendation. It would be very
interesting, and important, to explore how the effect on pri-
vacy compounds with multiple recommendations. Further,
some edges can be more sensitive than others. Perhaps the
solution should be methodological - enable opt-in/opt-out
settings to specify which nodes/edges are private. A closer
look at such dependences is required.
Also, most works on making recommendations deal with
static databases. Social networks clearly change over time
(and rather rapidly). This raises several issues, such as
not being able to assume the utility vector is known, sensi-
tivity changing, privacy impacts of dynamic databases etc.
Dealing with such temporal graphs and understanding there
trade-offs would be very interesting.
Finally, it would certainly be interesting to extend these
results for weaker notions of privacy than differential pri-
vacy. For instance, some privacy notions previously defined
include k-anonymity, (, δ)-differential privacy, and relaxing
the adversary’s background knowledge to just the general
statistics of the graph.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We initiate the analysis with a simple claim.
Claim 1. In order to achieve (1 − δ) accuracy, at least
c−δ
c
of the probability weight has to go to nodes in the high
utility group, so there exists a node x in the low utility group
of G1 that is recommended with probability of at most
δ
c(n−k) ,
e.g. pG1x ≤ δc(n−k) .
Proof. Denote by p+ and p− the total probability that
goes to high/low utility nodes, respectively, and observe that
p+umax + (1− c)umaxp− ≥∑i uipi ≥ (1− δ)umax and p+ +
p− ≤ 1, hence, p+ > c−δ
c
, p− ≤ δ
c
.
We now continue the proof of Lemma 1.
Let G2 be the graph that turns x, found according to the
Claim above, into a node of highest utility by addition of t
edges.
By differential privacy, we have p
G2
x
p
G1
x
≤ et.
In order to achieve (1 − δ) accuracy on G2, at least c−δc
of the probability weight has to go to nodes in the high
utility group, and hence by monotonicity Pr[x|G2] > c−δc(k+1) .
Combining the previous three inequalities, we obtain:
(c−δ)(n−k)
(k+1)δ
=
c−δ
c(k+1)
δ
c(n−k)
< p
G2
x
p
G1
x
≤ et, hence
 ≥ 1
t
(
ln(
c− δ
δ
) + ln(
n− k
k + 1
)
)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We first use the concentration axiom to prove
the following claim.
Claim 2. If c =
(
1− 1
logn
)
, then k = O(β logn) where
β is the parameter of the concentration axiom.
Proof. Now consider the case when c =
(
1− 1
logn
)
.
Therefore, k is the number of nodes that have utility at
least umax
logn
. Let the total utility mass be U =
∑
i ui. Since
by concentration, the β highest utility nodes add up to a
total utility mass of Ω(1)∗U , we have umax ≥ Ω(Uβ ). There-
fore, k, the number of nodes with utility at least umax
logn
is at
most U logn
umax
which is at most O(β logn).
We now prove the Lemma using Lemma 1 and Claim 2.
Substituting these in the expression, if we need 1− c(n−k)
n−k+(k+1)et
to be Ω(1), then require (k + 1)et to be Ω(n− k). (Notice
that if (k + 1)et = o(n− k), then c(n−k)
n−k+(k+1)et ≥ c− o(1),
which is 1− o(1).).
Therefore, if we want an algorithm to obtain constant
approximation in utility, i.e. (1 − δ) = Ω(1), then we need
the following (assuming β to be small):
(O(β logn))et = Ω((n−O(β logn))
Or (for small enough β)
et = Ω(
n
β logn
)
Simplifying
 ≥ logn− log β − log log n
t
 ≥ logn− o(logn)
t
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Lower Bound for Common Neighbors We
formalize the intuition in terms of an upper bound on t in
the following claim.
Claim 3. For common neighbors based utility functions,
when recommendations for r are being made, we have t ≤
dr + 2, where dr is the degree of node r.
Proof. Observe that if the number of common neighbors
is the measure of the utility of recommendation, then one
can make any zero utility node, say x, for source node r into
a max utility node by adding dr edges to all of r’s neighbors
and additionally adding two more edges (one each from r
and x) to some node with small utility. This is because the
highest utility node has at most dr common neighbors with r
(one of which could potentially be x). Further, adding these
edges cannot increase the number of common neighbors for
any other node beyond dr.
We now use this to get the theorem immediately by re-
placing t in the expression stated previously.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Lower Bound for Sum of Weighted Paths
The number of paths of length l between two nodes is at
most dl−1max. Let x be the highest utility node and let y be the
node we wish to make the highest utility node after adding
certain edges. If we are making recommendations for node
r, then the maximum number of common neighbors with r
is at most dr.
Currently denote the utility of x by ux. We know that
ux ≤ γdr∑infl=3 γl−1dl−1max. (In fact one can tighten the second
term as well.)
We rewire the graph as follows. Any (c−1)dr nodes (other
than y and the source node r) are picked; here c > 1 is to
be determined later. Both r and y are connected to these
(c− 1)dr nodes. Additionally, y is connected to all of r’s dr
neighbors. Therefore, we now get the following.
uy ≥ γcdr
Now we wish to bound by above the utility of any other
node in the network in this rewired graph. Notice that every
other node still has at most dr paths of length 2 with the
source. Further, there are only two nodes in the graph that
have degree more than dmax + 1, and they have degree at
most (c+1)dmax. Therefore, the number of paths of length l
for l ≥ 3 for any node is at most ((c+1)dmax)2 ·(dmax+1)l−3.
This can be further tightened to ((c+ 1)dmax)
2 · (dmax)l−3.
We therefore get the following for any x in the rewired graph,
ux ≤ γdr + (c+ 1)2
∞∑
l=3
γl−1dl−1max
Now consider the case where γ < 1
dmax
. We get
ux ≤ γdr + (c+ 1)
2γ2d2max
1− γdmax
We now want uy ≥ ux. This reduces to
(c− 1) ≥ (c+ 1)
2γdmax
1− γdmax
Now if γ = o( 1
dmax
) then it is sufficient to have (c− 1) =
Ω(γdmax) which can be achieved even with c = 1 + o(1).
Now notice that we only added dr + 2(c− 1)dr edges to the
graph. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Comment on relationship between common neigh-
bors and weighted paths: Since common neighbors is
an extreme case of weighted paths (as γ → 0), we are able
to obtain the same lower bound (up to o(1) terms) when
γ is made small (in particular, γ ≈ o( 1
dmax
). Can one ob-
tain (perhaps weaker) lower bounds when say γ = Θ( 1
dmax
)?
Notice that the proof only needs (c− 1) ≥ (c+1)2γdmax
1−γdmax . We
then get a lower bound of  ≥ 1
α
( 1−o(1)
2c−1 ) where dr = α logn.
Setting γdmax = s, for some constant s, we can find the
smallest c that satisfies the expression (c − 1) ≥ (c+1)2s
1−s .
Notice that this does give a nontrivial lower bound (i.e. a
lower bound tighter than the generic one presented in the
previous section), as long as s is a sufficiently small constant.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Utility of Laplace for n = 2: Suppose we
have two elements, with utility t1 and t2, respectively, where
t1 ≥ t2 wlog.
Let φX(t) denote the characteristic function of the Laplace
distribution, it is known that φX(t) =
1
1+b2t2
. Moreover, it
is known that if X1 and X2 are independently distributed
random variables, then φX1+X2(t) = φX1(t)φX2(t) =
1
(1+b2t2)2
.
Using the inversion formula, we can compute the pdf of
X = X1 +X2 as follows:
fX(x) = F
′
X(x) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−itxφX(t)dt
For x > 0, the pdf of X1 +X2 is fX(x) =
1
4b
(1 + x
b
)e−
x
b and
the cdf is FX(x) = 1− 14 e−x( 2 + x).
What is the probability that element 1 is recommended?
It’s the Pr[t1 + X1 > t2 + X2] = Pr[X2 −X1 < t1 − t2] =
1− 1
4
e−(t1−t2)( 2

+ (t1− t2)) = 1− 12e−(t1−t2)− (t1−t2)4e(t1−t2)
Hence, the Laplace mechanism recommends node 1 with
probability
1− 1
2
e−(t1−t2) − (t1 − t2)
4e(t1−t2)
,
from which the desired statement about AL’s utility fol-
lows.
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Sampling and Linear Smoothing
Let p′′i =
1−x
n
+ xpi. We have
1− x
n
≤ p′′i ≤ 1− x
n
+ x,
since 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1.
The utility of AS is
U(AS) =
n∑
k=1
ukp
′′
k =
n∑
k=1
(
1− x
n
)uk+
n∑
k=1
xpkuk =
1− x
n
+xγ ≥ xγ,
where we use
∑
k uk = 1 and
∑
pkuk = γ.
For the privacy guarantee, note again that the upper and
lower bounds on p′i hold for any graph and utility function.
Therefore, the change in the probability of recommending i
for any two graphs G and G′ that differ in exactly one edge
is at most
pi(G)
pi(G′)
≤ x+
1−x
n
1−x
n
= 1 +
nx
1− x .
Therefore, AS is ln(1+
nx
1−x )-differentially private. This com-
plete the proof.
Further, note, to guarantee 2- differentially privacy for
AS(x), we need to set the parameter x so that ln(1+
nx
1−x ) =
2c lnn (rewriting  = c lnn), namely
x =
n2c − 1
n2c − 1 + n.
The algorithm AS guarantees a utility of at least xγ.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose the variations on the common neighbor
functions permitted are ui = di/z, where di is the number of
common neighbors node i has with the target node, and z is
a scaling constant. Pick c = 1, meaning that all nodes except
k have zero utility. Then UO ≤ umax(1 − δ) ≤ umax(1 −
n−k
n−k+(k+1)eumax ) = umax
(k+1)eumax
n−k+(k+1)eumax .
Under our restricted privacy definition, the sensitivity of
the scaled number of common neighbors utility function is 1
z
.
UE ≥ umax ezumaxn−k+kezumax = umax e
umax
n−k+keumax ≥ umax e
umax
n−k+(k+1)eumax .
Hence UE
UO
≥ 1
k+1
and exponential algorithm gives a (k + 1)
approximation of utility, which could be a fairly good ap-
proximation, if k is small compared to n, which is what we
expect, in real-world social network graphs.
